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ABSTRACT

A casebook favorite for exploring the liquidated damage/penalty clause
distinction is Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co. in which Judge Posner found
a minimum quantity clause to be an unenforceable penalty clause. In this
paper I argue that the case was framed improperly. Had the litigators
recognized that the contract afforded one party an option, the result should
have been different. The contract was for the provision of a service-setting
aside capacity-which was valuable to the buyer and costly for the seller to
provide. The primary purpose of the minimum quantity clause was the pricing
of that service. The case indirectly raised a significant damages issue: if there
is an anticipatory repudiation of a contract that is take-or-pay or has a
stipulated damage clause, should the promisee's ability to mitigate be taken
into account when reckoning damages?

INTRODUCTION

IN my recent book, FramingContractLaw,' I argued that litigators and judges
often fail to understand the economics of transactions and that this failure
has implications both for interpreting a particular contract and for doctrine
itself. I illustrated that point by reexamining a number of significant contract
cases, many of them casebook staples. This paper provides one more piece of
evidence for the value of the enterprise by analyzing another casebook
favorite, Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.2 The example is particularly
compelling because the judge in this case was Richard Posner, one of the
most sophisticated practitioners of law and economics.
The litigators framed the case in terms of the liquidated damages/penalty
clause distinction. If a stipulated damage remedy in the agreement could be
characterized as liquidated damages it would be enforceable. But if a court
found it to be a penalty, it would not. A lot of scholarly writing, including that
of Judge Posner, has questioned the logic behind the penalty clause bar in

1.

VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW (2006).

2.

769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). The casebooks that rely on this case include, see, e.g. JOHN
D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS, 741-43 (5th ed. 2007); 1 STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN
KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 90-96 (2d ed. 2003);
ARTHUR ROSE-Er & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION, 226-32
(6th ed. 1999); ROBERT E. ScoTr &JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 980-87
(4th ed. 2007).
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contracts between sophisticated parties.3 Nevertheless, the doctrine has
survived. Indeed, in some states, notably Illinois, there is a presumption in
favor of finding a disputed clause to be an unenforceable penalty.
Corporation
Carborundum
defendant,
Lake River, the
In
("Carborundum"), had agreed to pay for a minimum quantity over three
years, but only took about half of the agreed upon amount. The plaintiff,
Lake River Company ("Lake River"), argued that the minimum was a
liquidated damage clause and should be honored. The defendant claimed that
enforcing the clause would yield an award in excess of actual damages and
therefore, the clause should be treated as a penalty. 4 Judge Posner, despite his
hostility to the penalty clause bar, accepted the defendant's version and threw
out the disputed clause. 5 In personal correspondence, Judge Posner said that
he was bound by the parties' framing of the issue.6 My purpose is not to
apportion responsibility. Rather, it is to demonstrate the power of the
economic approach.
Properly understood, the language in question was neither a penalty nor a
liquidated damage clause. That question should never have arisen. The
contract gave the buyer considerable discretion as to when and how much it
would use the seller's services. By granting the buyer flexibility, the seller
provided a valuable service and incurred some costs in providing that service.
The minimum quantity clause was a key factor in defining the obligation and
in pricing the service. Even if one were to cling to the stipulated damages
framework, the analysis would demonstrate that the stipulated damages were
not necessarily excessive. Given the proper understanding, a reasonable court
could easily have found a valid liquidated damage cause. Of course, a single
case study cannot show that the doctrine is wrong, but the debunking of a
famous decision is at least a step in that direction.
While I am arguing that the litigators did not understand the economics
of the transaction, I do not mean to suggest that things would have been fine

3.

RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 128-31 (6th ed. 2003). See also Ugo

4.

Mattei, The ComparaiveLaw and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L.
427, 428-30 (1995); Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penaly Clauses and Spedfic
Performance, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 246 (1981) (finding ultimately that the penalty clause
bar might be an efficient rule); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theoy and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 616-17 (2003); Alan Schwartz, The Myth That
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatogy Remedies: An Analysis of Contractingfor Damage Measures, 100
YALE L.J. 369, 370 (1990).
Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1286.

5.

Id. at 1290.

6.

E-mail from Hon. Richard A. Posner, Judge, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, to author
(Feb. 18, 2007) (on file with the Virginia Law & Business Review).
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had they only asked the transactional lawyers or the principals themselves.
The deal participants also might have had no idea why they structured the
transaction as they did, or they might not have been capable of articulating
their reasons. To take an example from antitrust law, parties were using
vertical restrictions (exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, resale price
maintenance, etc.) long before a coherent economic rationale was developed.
My approach is to use economic reasoning to understand why reasonable
business people would structure their affairs in a particular manner, not to
7
focus on the explanation that the parties give.
Nearly two decades ago, Judge Posner bemoaned the mismatch of the
facts as presented in judicial opinions with the actual facts, and argued that
this had adverse consequences for the development of doctrine:
If factual uncertainty is disproportionately characteristic of
litigated cases . . . then, given the difficulty of dispelling such
uncertainty by the methods of litigation, we can expect the
factual recitals in published judicial opinions to be wrong much
of the time ....
And especially in cases where there is no published dissent,
judicial opinions exemplify "winners' history." The appellate
court will usually state the facts as favorably to its conclusions as
the record allows, and often more favorably.... The tendency I
have described is abetted by the reluctance of academic
commentators to expand their study of cases beyond judicial
opinions. Rarely will the commentator get hold of the briefs and
record to check the accuracy of the factual recitals in the
opinion.
• * * One of the distinctive features of judges as policy
makers-and it should be clear by now that judges in our
system are, to a significant degree, policy-making officials-is
that they obtain much of their knowledge of how the world
works from materials that are systematically unreliable sources
of information.8
His point is well-illustrated by Lake River. The facts as presented in the
opinion are misleading. The role of the suspect clause cannot be understood
without other contract language absent from the opinion. Its absence is a
7.
8.

For a bit more on this standard, see GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 378-79.
RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 210-11 (1990).
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symptom of the problem-the litigators failed to appreciate the underlying
economics of the transaction and their framing of the issues reflected that.
In Part I, I will summarize the trial judge's opinion and the arguments
made in the respective parties' briefs. In Part II, I will present Judge Posner's
opinion. His argument, which largely tracks Carborundum's, was that
enforcement would dramatically over-compensate Lake River, and, therefore,
the minimum clause would be an unenforceable penalty. In Part III, I will
introduce two clauses in the contract that were ignored by all the participants,
but which put the suspect clause in perspective. I will then show how, if the
issue had been properly framed, the over-compensation question disappears. I
will first show why the clause helped define the contractual obligation and
had nothing to do with stipulated damages. I will then show that even if the
clause were viewed as defining stipulated damages, the estimate would have
been reasonable (or at least not unreasonable); it should fall in the liquidated
damages category. Finally, I will consider a thorny doctrinal problem, raised
only obliquely in Lake River if there is an anticipatory repudiation of a
contract containing a stipulated damage remedy or a minimum quantity,
should the promisee's mitigation (technically, avoidance) be taken into
account in assessing the promissor's liability?
I.

THE CASE PRE-POSNER

The story as recounted in the briefs and the opinions is a simple one.
Carborundum entered into a three-year contract with Lake River which would
bag and distribute Ferro Carbo, an abrasive powder. In order to prevent
possible contamination with other products, Carborundum insisted that Lake
River install a new bagging system costing $89,000 to be used exclusively for
Ferro Carbo. 9 The clause in controversy (Paragraph 4) was a minimumquantity guarantee:
In consideration of the special equipment [i.e., the new
bagging system] to be acquired and furnished by LAKE-RIVER
for handling the product, CARBORUNDUM shall, during the
initial three-year term of this Agreement, ship to LAKE-RIVER
for bagging a minimum quantity of [22,500 tons]. If, at the end
of the three-year term, this minimum quantity shall not have
been shipped, LAKE-RIVER shall invoice CARBORUNDUM
9.

Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1286. All numbers have been rounded to the nearest
thousand. Id. at 1287.
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at the then prevailing rates for the difference between the
quantity bagged and the minimum guaranteed.')
Because the demand for Ferro Carbo had declined, Carborundum only
bagged about 12,000 tons in the three years, 55% of the minimum. The costs
of Lake River's services were only about four to five percent of the value of
the bagged product." Had Carborundum shipped the minimum, it would
have paid $533,000.12 Carborundum actually paid $292,000 leaving a shortfall
of $241,000, which Lake River argued it was entitled to as liquidated damages.
Carborundum refused, precipitating the litigation. To assure payment, Lake
River engaged in self-help, asserting a lien over 500 tons of Ferro Carbo in its
possession. 13 Both the trial judge and Judge Posner found that it was not
entitled to assert that lien; 14 that issue need not concern us.
The trial judge found that the purpose of Paragraph 4 was to stipulate
damages and that it passed muster:
Paragraph 4 of the contract was inserted in order to
estimate damages which would be sustained by Lake River in
the event the contract was not fulfilled. In other words,
paragraph 4 was in the contract as an attempt by Lake River to
assure a certain return on its investment in the special
5
equipment to be purchased, and Carborundum knew this.'
The clause was valid, the court argued, because
At the time that the parties entered into the Agreement, the
amount of injury which would be suffered by Lake River in the
event of a breach by Carborundum was uncertain in amount
and difficult to measure, given the unpredictability of the timing
or amounts of shipments of product by Carborundum to Lake
River, and the inability to predict with any degree of accuracy
10.
11.

Id. at 1286.
Id. The price for Lake River's services turned out to be about $24 per ton
($533,000/22,500). Lake River, as self-help, attempted (unsuccessfully) to keep 500 tons
valued at $269,000. Id. The market unit price, therefore, was $538 per ton ($269,000/500),
making Lake River's services 4-5% of the market price. ($24/$538).
12. Id. The pricing formula was in a separate schedule that was not reproduced in the briefs.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1288.
15. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., No. 82 C 6292, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar.
15, 1984), aff'd inpart,rev'd inpart,769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
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the flow of revenue under the contract. The minimum quantity
agreed to between the parties was not unrealistic or
16
unreasonably large.
These findings were designed to satisfy the Illinois standard which Judge
Posner characterized in this way:
To be valid under Illinois law a liquidation of damages must
be a reasonable estimate at the time of contracting of the likely
damages from breach, and the need for estimation at that time
must be shown by reference to the likely difficulty of measuring
the actual damages from a breach of contract after the breach
occurs. If damages would be easy to determine then, or if the
estimate greatly exceeds a reasonable upper estimate of what the
17
damages are likely to be, it is a penalty.
In their briefs, both parties accepted the framing of the question as the
proper characterization of the stipulated damages.' 8 Carborundum's argument
that the clause was an unenforceable penalty had two prongs. First, it used the
testimony of Lake River's contract negotiator, James Passerelli, to show that
Lake River did not intend to provide a reasonable estimate of damagesindeed, it was entirely unconcerned with damage measurement. Second, it
argued that application of the clause in certain contexts would be punitive
19
because it would result in an assessment far exceeding actual damages.
Passerelli's testimony was characterized, not entirely accurately, as
follows: "In fact, Passerelli testified that Lake River's sole purpose for
inserting the provision in the contract was to force Carborundum to perform
the agreement." 20 Passerelli's actual testimony reads as follows:
QUESTION: When you put the minimum quantity
provision in the contract you were merely trying to assure a
return on investment and you were not attempting to estimate
16. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., No. 82 C 6292, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar.
15, 1984), affd in part,rev'd inpart,769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
17. Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1289-90.
18. Reply and Responsive Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee at 4, Lake River Corp., 769
F.2d 1284 (Nos. 84-1623, 84-1688) [hereinafter Lake River Reply Brief]; Brief of
Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 11, Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d 1284 (Nos. 841623, 84-1688) [hereinafter Carborundum Brief].
19. Carborundum Brief, supra note 18, at 13, 17.
at 14.
20. Id.
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the damages that Lake River would sustain if Carborundum
breached the contract, were you?
ANSWER: That's correct.
QUESTION: Indeed what you wanted to do was to assure
that either Carborundum would go through and perform the
contract as it had agreed or that Carborundum would be forced
to pay Lake River as if it had gone through with the contract?
ANSWER: That's correct.
QUESTION: Indeed, what you provided in the contract
was that if Carborundum breached the contract it would have to
pay 100 percent of the amount that it would have paid if it had
gone through with the contract, isn't that correct?
21
ANSWER: I believe that is correct, yes.
The testimony did not say anything about "forcing" Carborundum to
peforr, it was only forced to pay. It did, however, suggest that the purpose of
the clause was unrelated to any damage projections. This led Carborundum to
point out that "by Lake River's own admission, Paragraph 4 was not inserted
to provide a fair estimate of damages to be paid as an alternative to
performance." 22 Lake River's response to this was a rather lame attempt to
downplay Passerelli's legal sophistication: "[tihe minimum guarantee
provision was not inserted as a determination of the legal damages Lake River
would incur as a result of a breach by Carborundum, since Passerelli, who
negotiated the Agreement, was unfamiliar with the concept of legal
damages. '23 Ignorance is not much of a defense, especially when the
agreement was negotiated by a senior employee and signed by the president.
Lake River was trapped by the framing of the issue as penalty versus
liquidated damages. Otherwise, it could have turned the testimony to its
advantage by agreeing that it had not intended that the clause be related to
damages, but that it had another purpose entirely.
Second, Carborundum argued that enforcement of the clause would, in
certain circumstances, result in overcompensation. It began with a reductio ad
absurdum:

21.
22.
23.

Id. at 13-15.
Id. at 15.
Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee at 11, Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d 1284 (Nos. 841623, 84-1688) [hereinafter Lake River Brief].
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[TIf Carborundum had not delivered one pound of the
Product, pursuant to the literal terms of Paragraph 4, Lake River
could bill Carborundum $533,700.00. Simple mathematics
reveals that Lake River would have received an almost 600
percent return on its $89,404.00 investment for equipment that
has a useful life beyond the term of the Agreement. It is patent
that there is absolutely no relationship between the amount of
damages that could be estimated at the inception of the
Agreement and the amount provided in Paragraph 4.24
It went on to argue that Lake River had underestimated costs so that, if
there had there been full performance, Lake River would have lost money. An
25
award of $241,000 would, therefore, have given Lake River a large windfall.
Lake River conceded that it had underestimated costs, but claimed that it still
would have made a modest profit had Carborundum fully performed. 26 The
trial court found that if Carborundum had delivered the contract minimum
"Lake River still may not have made a profit on the contract. '27 The accuracy
of the profit projections doesn't matter for our purposes and the issue did not
surface in Posner's opinion. If it had mattered, he surely would have been
justified in accepting the trial court's finding as not clearly erroneous.
I will argue in Part III that the economic rationale for Paragraph 4 was
that it was meant to constrain Carborundum's discretion regarding its use of
Lake River's facilities. Lake River did at least hint at an argument of this sort:

Mhe Agreement was structured so that Lake River would
have to stand ready to perform throughout the Agreement's
term, even though Carborundum's actual shipments might be
considerably reduced. Under the circumstances of reduced
shipments, such as actually occurred here, expenses which Lake
River might have saved had Carborundum been forthright
about its intent not to perform were in fact continuously
28
incurred throughout the contract term.
Carborundum Brief, supra note 18, at 15-16 (citation omitted).
Id. at 17.
Lake River Reply Brief, supra note 18, at 14.
filed Mar.
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., No. 82 C 6292, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill.
15, 1984), affdinpart,rev'd inpart,769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
28. Lake River Reply Brief, supra note 18, at 10. The "forthright about its intent" language is
typical of the over-the-top language in the briefs of both sides.

24.
25.
26.
27.
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Lake River also claimed that Carborundum had "agreed to a higher
minimum volume in return for a lower unit price. ' 29 I am suspicious of this
statement since in its extensive recounting of the negotiations, Lake River did
not identify any instance in which the contract price was reduced in exchange
30
for an increase in the minimum volume.
Both parties agreed that the contract had been breached and that the
breach was Carborundum's failure to send the minimum amount of Ferro
Carbo to Lake River. Had Lake River's counsel understood the transaction,
he would have identified a different breach. At the end of the three years, the
contract had been fully performed, save for Carborundum's failure to pay.
That failure was the only breach. After summarizing Judge Posner's opinion, I
will elaborate on that point.
II. POSNER'S

DECISION

What has made the case so attractive to casebook authors was that Judge
Posner was playing against type. Although he did not believe the rule against
enforcement of penalty clauses made sense when dealing with agreements
negotiated by sophisticated business parties, he felt bound by Illinois law. 31
He concluded that Paragraph 4 was an unenforceable penalty clause because,
if the liquidated damages were awarded, Lake River's total compensation
would always exceed what it would have earned had Carborundum met the
minimum quantity. He began with a variant on Carborundum's argument:
Suppose to begin with that the breach occurs the day after
Lake River buys its new bagging system for $89,000 and before
Carborundum ships any Ferro Carbo. Carborundum would owe
Lake River $533,000. Since Lake River would have incurred at
that point a total cost of only $89,000, its net gain from the
breach would be $444,000. This is more than four times the
profit of $107,000 (20 percent of the contract price of $533,000)
that Lake River expected to make from the contract if it had
been performed: a huge windfall. 32

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.at 2.
Id.at 8-11.
Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1288-89.
Id.at 1290.
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Carborundum, in making the same point, had failed to subtract the cost
of the bagging system, but that doesn't really matter since either number will
do. The significant difference between the two formulations is more subtle.
Carborundum, recall, asked what would happen if it had failed to deliver even
one pound; its breach would not have occurred until the three years had
expired. Posner's hypothetical involves a breach, or anticipatory repudiation,
33
on day one. That raises a different issue, one that I will consider below.
Posner then made calculations of Lake River's profit for various
quantities short of the 22,500 ton minimum. 34 The expected cost at the
minimum quantity was $533,000 less the 20% profit that Lake River had
projected (although as noted above, they would not have achieved, because
the cost projections were overly optimistic). He then assumed that the only
fixed cost was the bagging system and that the variable costs were roughly
proportional to the quantity. 35 So, for the actual output of 55%, Lake River's
expected profit would be $19,000 for the service provided plus $241,000 in
damages-over twice its expected profit had Carborundum performed. 36 For
all quantities below the minimum, Lake River's net would exceed the profits
had Carborundum met its minimum contract obligation. Moreover, he
pointed out, his calculations assumed that the bagging system had no value
apart from the contract. If it had some value, he noted, the numbers would
37
get even worse.
Before turning to the contract itself, I should note that this calculation
exaggerates the discrepancy. Distinguishing fixed and variable costs can be
problematic, but it is safe to say that the bagging system was not the only
fixed cost. Unless the 20% profit was meant to be the payment for all the
other fixed factors (management salaries, the building, the warehouse, etc.),
fixed costs over the life of the contract were undoubtedly higher. One
obvious variable cost was the bagging material, but responsibility for that was

33. See infra Part IV.
34. This argument paralleled one made by Carborundum in its Reply Brief. Reply Brief of
Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 9, Lake River Coo., 769 F.2d 1284 (Nos. 841623, 84-1688).
35. With these assumptions, the variable costs at the minimum output would have been
$533,000-$107,000-$89,000=$337,000. Average variable costs would have been
$337,000/22,500 = $15 and the contract price would have been $533,000/22,500 =
S23.70. Only 12,000 tons were bagged for which Lake River received $23.70x12,000 =
$284,400. Variable costs were $15x12,000 = $180,000. Profits would have been revenue
minus variable costs minus fixed costs, or $284,400-$180,000-$89,000 = $15,400. This
number differs slightly from Posner's because of differences in rounding.
36. Lake River Coo., 769 F.2d at 1290-91.

37. Id.
at 1291.
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assigned to Carborundum in clause 3. Still, if Lake River were guaranteed
$533,000 regardless of the quantity bagged, then, for any quantity below the
minimum, Lake River would appear to do better than if it had produced the
minimum. So, if we take the Illinois penalty clause language narrowly, the
minimum payment of Paragraph 4 must always result in a compensatory
payment in excess of Lake River's damages, and it should lose. The numerical
illustration, right or wrong, adds nothing, save an exclamation point.

III. FRAMING THE DISPUTE
Posner's opinion did not consider any possible explanations for why the
minimum payment might have been included in the contract. Although the
contract itself was attached as an appendix to Lake River's brief,38 neither the
parties nor the courts invoked any of the other contract language. Two
clauses are of particular importance, providing the context that was lacking in
the briefs and the written opinions. Without them it is hard to understand
why Carborundum would agree to a minimum.
1. Scope of Agreement. From time to time during the term
of this Agreement, CARBORUNDUM shall ship to LAKERIVER's packaging plant located at Berwyn, Illinois, quantities
of CARBORUNDUM's product known as "Ferro Carbo"
(called "Product"). CARBORUNDUM agrees to purchase from
LAKE-RIVER and LAKE-RIVER agrees to furnish to
CARBORUNDUM all terminal services necessary for the
orderly conduct of CARBORUNDUM's business in the
marketing and distribution of the product.

2.c. Shipping. LAKE-RIVER shall load and ship the bagged
product for CARBORUNDUM's account and according to
CARBORUNDUM's shipping instructions. For scheduling
purposes, LAKE-RIVER shall not be required to bag more than
four hundred (400) tons of product each week. LAKE-RIVER
shall ship bagged product from storage or from current
production by trucks or box cars as CARBORUNDUM shall
direct. Trucks and box cars shall be loaded in accordance with
38.

Lake River Brief, supranote 23, at App. 13.
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instructions issued by CARBORUNDUM. Sufficient dunnage
shall be furnished by LAKE-RIVER for CARBORUNDUM's
account to properly protect bagged product in transit. Shipping
documents shall be prepared and distributed by LAKE-RIVER
39
as directed by CARBORUNDUM.
Consider first clause 2.c. Buried in the middle of a paragraph about
shipping instructions is the only explicit contractual constraint on
Carborundum's claim for Lake River's services. It could not ask Lake River to
bag more than 400 tons in any week. (I have no idea why the maximum
obligation was located in the middle of a clause dealing with other, largely
mechanical, matters.) So, had Carborundum shipped the maximum each week
it would have bagged over 60,000 tons-about three times the contract
minimum. However, the contract language itself is not entirely consistent with
the parties' description of the contract. Lake River's brief, for example, cites
the testimony of a Carborundum executive saying that the "equipment he
recommended be purchased had the capacity to bag 10,000 tons per year," 40
roughly half the contractual maximum and one-third greater than the
contractual minimum. Even though the facilities would be designed to handle
10,000 tons per year, Lake River was obligated to stand ready to handle twice
that amount. Doing so might have entailed considerable extra costs. Or,
perhaps, this was simply a drafting error. Regardless, it seems clear that Lake
River had committed itself to being ready to bag up to 400 tons per week
every week for three years.41 The contract gave Carborundum considerable
discretion regarding the timing. However, Lake River overstated
Carborundum's flexibility, arguing that Lake River faced "complete uncertainty as
'42
to when Carborundum would ship the Product for bagging.
Returning to clause 1, what is it that Carborundum promised to do? This
was neither a full-output nor a requirements contract; Carborundum only said
that it would deliver Ferro Carbo "from time to time." The contract was for
two things. First, Lake River would bag and distribute some product if
Carborundum delivered it. However, Carborundum did not promise to

39.
40.
41.

42.

Id. at 13-14.
Id.
at 15.
If Carborundum had been taking the 400 ton maximum week after week, Lake River
might have been able to limit its obligation by invoking U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1978). I think
that invoking "good faith" to trump contractual limits on quantity discretion is a bad idea,
but it is plausible that if Lake River found the high demands burdensome, it could have
successfully invoked the U.C.C. See GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 101.
Lake River Reply Brief, supra note 18, at 5 (emphasis added).

440
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deliver any product. Second, Lake River promised that it would stand ready to
bag a certain amount of Ferro Carbo at a fixed price (subject to adjustment
for labor costs), and it would stand ready for three years. Carborundum
remained free to buy bagging and distribution services from anyone.
Carborundum's option is the crucial feature of the contract. If for any reason
Carborundum decided not to send product to Lake River, it wouldn't have to.
So, if it received a better offer, had lower costs at its other facilities, 43 or if
demand for its services fell off, it would have no obligation to use Lake
River's services.
We do not know what was in the minds of the contracting parties. The
best evidence we have is the written document. It may have been poorly
drafted, but, however inartful the language, the obligations of both parties
were plain. The contract can be rephrased to make the structure clearer:
Carborundum agrees to pay a flat rate of $533,000 over the course of the
three years (subject to the labor cost adjustment) for the right to have 22,500
tons bagged during that period. Any additional tonnage will be billed at the
rates set forth in the price schedule. The timing of the payment of the
$533,000 depends on when Carborundum uses Lake River's services.
Carborundum does not, however, commit to when, or if, it will send any
product for bagging. It simply has an option. That option is constrained; it
cannot require Lake River to bag more than 400 tons in a week.
Lake River provided a valuable service by standing ready to bag
Carborundum's product. The minimum quantity/minimum payment served
two functions (in addition to providing consideration). 44 First, given that
Carborundum would have been free to take its business to a lower-cost
provider during the three years, the minimum payment drastically reduced the
incentive to do so. In effect the clause set the price on the first 22,500 tons at
$0.45 Only for quantities greater than the minimum would Carborundum find
it potentially profitable to shop.
Second, it priced the service Lake River provided. Carborundum paid for
three years' worth of access to Lake River's bagging facilities at a
predetermined pricing formula and that is what it received. It could decide
whether to exercise its option (that is, use the facilities) after it learned more
43. After Lake River refused to release the product, Carborundum shipped from other

44.
45.

facilities. The trial judge noted that "Carborundum has incurred additional costs and
expenses for shipping and handling Ferro Carbo from other locations in order to meet its
obligations to customers." Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., No. 82 C 6292, slip op.
at 6 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 15, 1984), affdinpart,rev'd in part, 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
Absent the first dause of Paragraph 4, this would have been an illusory agreement.
As it turned out, $0 was too high.
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about market conditions. The price of that flexibility has nothing to do with
damage estimates. The flexibility had value to Carborundum and it was costly
to provide for Lake River. The price, like that for other services, would fall
somewhere between the expected value to the former and the expected cost
of the latter. The price was not quoted explicitly. The higher the minimum,
the greater the implicit price of the flexibility. Perhaps Carborundum paid too
much for the flexibility, but there is no reason to second-guess the
consideration paid for provision of a valuable service.
When we recognize that the contract was one giving Carborundum
substantial discretion for three years, then it is clear that Posner's
characterization of the contract as still being executory is incorrect:
Lake River was the victim of a breach of a portion of the
contract that remained entirely unexecuted on either side.
Carborundum had not shipped the other 10,500 tons, as
promised; but on the other hand Lake River had not had to bag
46
those 10,500 tons, as it had promised.
But, as Lake River's counsel asserted, it had fully performed; there was
nothing left to execute. For three years it had stood ready to bag up to 400
tons of Ferro per week. "Carborundum's argument that Lake River incurred
no expenses as a result of the breach ignores the reality that Lake River's
expenses, as required by the Agreement, were all incurred before the breach47
which occurred at the end of the Agreement's term on September 1, 1982."
Even if we were to treat the suspect clause as one stipulating damages,
the expected damages are not confined to those Judge Posner recognized. As
Lake River noted, "the quid pro quo Lake River received for giving
Carborundum control over the timing of product shipments was a guaranteed
minimum amount of revenue. ' 48 The district court and Lake River
emphasized the uncertainty of the revenue stream as a justification for the
minimum. But the timing itself is not the problem. In order to afford
Carborundum flexibility in determining the tonnage to be bagged, Lake River
had to incur costs (explicit or otherwise) in addition to the bagging machine
costs mentioned in the contract and in Judge Posner's opinion. To stand
ready to perform, Lake River might have to maintain a larger facility or labor
force than otherwise; or it might have had to maintain sufficient capacity to

46. Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1287.
47. Lake River Reply Brief, stora note 18, at 10.
48. Id. at 7.
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remain ready to meet this obligation; or, perhaps most important, it might
have had to forego an attractive alternative. Lake River did note some of the
additional costs, although it failed to mention the opportunity costs:
Under the Agreement, Lake River was required to spend
more than $89,000 to purchase bagging equipment, was required
to set up a brand new bagging operation to be used exclusively
for Carborundum's Product, and was required to incur all of the
fixed costs associated with setting aside the necessary space
(including plant depreciation, corporate overhead, taxes, and
utilities such as light and heat). Lake River was also required to
have sufficient manpower available to run the bagging
operation, but could not efficiently allocate such manpower
between the Carborundum project and its other projects in light
of the uncertainty over the timing of product shipments by
Carborundum. 49
If we treat payment for the minimum quantity as stipulated damages, with
this understanding of the contract it should be clear that damage estimation
would be extremely difficult ex ante and measurement would be extremely
difficult expost. For example, determining what opportunities were foregone
(or, ex ante, could be foregone) by Lake River because it had to stand ready to
bag 400 tons per week for three years with a fixed price schedule would be a
complex (if not futile) exercise. The clause should certainly meet the Illinois
criterion concerning "the likely difficulty of measuring actual damages. 50° So,
even if we treat the minimum payment clause as subject to the penalty clause
bar, a better understanding of the contract would make the liquidated
damages characterization more plausible.
One doctrinal device for avoiding the penalty clause rule is to treat the
payment as an "alternative performance." 5' Take-or-pay contracts, in which
the buyer agrees to pay for a minimum whether it actually takes that quantity,
have routinely been enforced. Posner attempted to distinguish this contract
from a take-or-pay agreement,5 2 even though neither party had raised the
issue in its briefs. He distinguished, apparently, on the basis of the relative
49. Id. at 6.
50. Lake River Coo., 769 F.2d at 1289.
51.
52.

See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.18 n.44 (2d ed. 2001).
"We do not mean by this discussion to cast a cloud of doubt over the 'take or pay'
clauses that are a common feature of contracts between natural gas pipeline companies
and their customers." Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1292.
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magnitude of the fixed costs: "If, as appears not to be the case here but
would often be the case in supplying natural gas, a supplier's fixed costs were
a very large fraction of his total costs, a take-or-pay clause might well be a
reasonable liquidation of damages. '5 3 The high fixed cost, or more precisely,
the specificity of an asset, is not the essential feature of the take-or-pay
contracts. Asset specificity is, at most, a sufficient, but not necessary
condition. The key feature is that the seller incurs costs by granting discretion
to the buyer. A take-or-pay arrangement (say, between a coal mine and a
power company) and this contract perform the same role in the same way.
The party with discretion (Carborundum or the power company) has to pay
the opposite party (Lake River or the coal mine) for the costs it could incur
by affording that discretion. Both set a non-linear pricing formula: a fixed
price independent of usage, a zero marginal price up to the minimum, and a
54
positive marginal price thereafter.

IV. THE ANTICIPATORY

REPUDIATION

HYPo

The contract, as I noted above, was fully performed by Lake River. But
what if the contract were in fact breached prior to the end of the three-year
period? Recall that in Judge Posner's hypothetical the contract was breached
on the first day. There is a fundamental difference between the case in which
the three-year term had expired and one in which one party repudiated prior
to expiration. How should we treat an anticipatory repudiation or the
premature total breach of a long-term contract? The major difference is that
once the contract is recognized as abandoned, Lake River's resources would
be freed up. Carborundum should still be responsible for paying for the
minimum quantity; it had breached its promise to pay. However, the damages
could be offset by the value of the resources freed up by the termination.
Posner claimed that Lake River raised this argument: "Lake River argues
that it would never get as much as the formula suggests, because it would be
required to mitigate its damages."55 I assume that this was raised in oral
argument, because it was not in the briefs. He rejected the argument because,
he claimed, it would undercut the virtues of liquidated damages.56 However, if
Lake River's counsel was responding to the premature breach scenario, it
would be a sensible response. If Lake River no longer had to assure that it
53.
54.
55.

Id.
For further analysis of take-or-pay contracts see GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at ch. 5. Pay-orplay clauses perform the same role in movie contracts. See id. at ch. 15.
Lake RiverCorp., 769 F.2d at 1291.

56. Id.
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could bag 400 tons per week, it could have used its capacity for other
purposes. So, while Carborundum would still be responsible for the minimum
payment in the event of an anticipatory repudiation, the law migbt require it to
offset against that payment revenues received from utilizing the freed up
capacity elsewhere.
I said might in the previous paragraph, purposefully, since the law
regarding damages for the anticipatory repudiation of a long-term contract is
a bit of a mess. Even if it is a contract for goods falling squarely in the takeor-pay/alternative performance box, courts struggle with the problem.57 The
problem is compounded when the contract is for a service (like bagging);
contract law has been somewhat less inclined to offset in "to do" contracts,
the reason being that it could have been possible to do the additional work
while still performing the contract. 58 Regardless, the mitigation principal
should remain valid, although its implementation might turn out to be
complicated.
The problem is further compounded if the disputed clause is
characterized as being for stipulated damages, rather than as an essential
element of the agreement defining the limits on Carborundum's discretion.
As a matter of sound economics and policy, there should be no difference.
However, if the stipulated damage remedy is viewed as exclusive, one could
argue that there should be no offset following an anticipatory repudiation.
Judge Posner has taken that position in private correspondence.5 9 I do not
believe that the law requires identical treatment of a breach and an
anticipatory repudiation, but I am content to leave it as a recommendation: in
the event of an anticipatory repudiation, the law should offset the promisee's
benefits against the stipulated damages.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The preceding suggests five conclusions. First, what was at stake in this
contract was the provision of a service-setting aside capacity-which was
valuable to the buyer and costly for the seller to provide. The primary
purpose of the minimum quantity clause was to price that service, not to
define a remedy. Second, even if a court did somehow choose to read the
clause as a stipulated remedy, the difficulty of measuring the costs incurred by

57.
58.

59.

See, e.g., Tractebel EneW Mktg. v. AEP Power Mktg., 487 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); Roje Rea/y
& Developing, Inc. v. Ark/a, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1993).
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, § 12.12.
E-mail from Hon. Richard A. Posner to author, supra note 6.
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setting aside capacity would have made the clause a plausible liquidation of
damages. Third, the doctrinal boxes led to the obscuring of the simple
economics of the transaction. Absent an economic framework, the litigators
could not make the argument cleanly, although bits and pieces of it did appear
in their briefs. Fourth, there is a big difference between a failure to hit a
minimum target in a completed contract and a premature breach of that
contract. For the latter, it is plausible that the damages should be offset by the
non-breacher's gains from redeploying the freed-up assets. Finally, while we
cannot generalize from a single data point, this analysis provides one more bit
of ammunition against the penalty clause bar for contracts between
60
sophisticated parties.

60.

For another, see GOLDBERG, supra note 1, ch. 17.

